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Abstract. This article contributes to the emerging literature on digital encryption as a political issue by 
focusing on the way in which debates about encryption are embedded in a broader security discourse. 
Drawing on empirical material from Germany, this article shows how debates on encryption bring its 
ambiguous nature to the fore. Encryption is seen as both a threat and a source of protection, it thus 
becomes clear that technology only acquires its political meaning in discourse. Furthermore, I show that 
security is discussed in terms of uncertainty, risks and complexity. The article concludes by arguing that 
this prevailing idea of security as risk leads to security measures that attempt to deal with complexity 
by involving a variety of actors, making multi-stakeholder approaches as a solution more plausible.
1. Introduction: Encryption as Political Technology
Encryption technology is considered to be a core technology, not only for privacy 
and prevention of surveillance but also for security in general. Encryption can prevent 
access by third parties to communications and is thus crucial for e-commerce (Hosein 
2017; Di e, Landau 1998). Today, encryption is implemented in any networked tech-
nology. Even more so, encryption is a highly political technology. It ensures private 
communication by preventing unwelcome third-party access, increasing the degree of 
anonymity and thus allowing secure communication for everybody. But this means that 
it also allows secure communication for criminals, potentially preventing law-enforce-
ment from accessing digital communication. he debate about encryption is deeply 
embedded in debates about privacy and the freedom of speech, in short: democracy. 
Ater the revelations by Edward Snowden, the question about the value of encryption 
attracted new attention (Meinrath, Vitka 2014; Schulze 2017) ater a previous decline 
in public attention. I focus on this part of the debate that has emerged since 2013.
Scholarship on these most recent debates is only beginning to emerge and comes 
from a variety of disciplines. Interest in the topic is not limited to computer scien-
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tists, as the political character of the debates is seen by commentators from all kinds 
of ields (Schneier 2013; DuPont 2015; Froomkin 1995; Gürses, Kundnani, Hobo-
ken 2016). I expand on this research by taking an explicit interest in encryption as 
a security issue. his paper uses insights from the ield of Critical Security Studies 
(CSS) to understand how encryption is located within a broader security discourse. 
Much research has focused on the US, but this article concentrates speciically on 
Germany given that it provides a contrast to the United States for several reasons. 
Firstly, Germany is a country traditionally very concerned with privacy (at least as 
its self-perception) and the assumption is thus that encryption is debated in more 
positive terms than in the US. Secondly, Germany is one of the main producers of 
encryption sotware. Strong encryption regulation in the US would be an asset for 
the German economy and its development of encryption. his is important, since 
claims for higher regulation are made, even though regulation would only be truly 
efective if successfully implemented in all countries. Political efort to regulate the 
export of encryption or implementing weaker encryption is thus less discussed than 
debates occurring in the US during the 1990s (Diie, Landau 1998; Schulze 2017; 
Steiger, Schünemann, Dimmroth 2017).
he article proceeds as follows: in the next section I discuss how CSS has tried to 
conceptualize the security practices that emerge in relation to new networked tech-
nology. I then continue with some brief remarks on my methodology and methods. 
In the main section, I present my results from the discourse analysis. Two issues are 
core here: irstly, encryption is embedded in security discourse in an ambivalent way. 
It is considered to be both a threat and a means of protection. Secondly, encryption 
security is characterized by decentralization, uncertainty and unpredictability. here-
fore encryption security can thus be said to follow a logic of risk having distinct im-
plications for security policies. he conclusion summarizes the results and highlights 
the implication for our understanding of governing encryption as a security issue.
2. Security Technology
Security Studies, a sub-ield of International Relations, is traditionally concerned 
with understanding security politics between states (Waltz 2010). his research fo-
cuses on issues such as war and foreign policy. However, the vibrant ield of Critical 
Security Studies that emerged in the 1970s broadened its research agenda by including 
other security phenomena such as migration or health security (Buzan and Hansen 
2009). For our discussion on encryption, two conceptual insights are important.
Firstly, researchers have shown that security practices enter everyday life and can be 
found in multiple places (Lyon 2003; Bigo 2012; Gaufman 2017). Security practices are 
no longer limited to high politics, but impact everyday activities and are both difuse 
and decentered (Huysmans 2014; 2011). Analyzing security politics thus not only means 
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inquiring about war and foreign policy but also how it impacts the everyday life of cit-
izens (Stevens and Vaughan-Williams 2017). Especially feminist scholars have shown 
how security politics is enacted in everyday practice and impacts the most vulnerable 
people. War is thus not only something that happens between states in an abstract way, 
but in order to understand war one needs to look at the ground level and scrutinize the 
everyday life of women and children, too (Nordstrom 1997; Wibben 2016).
In line with the focus on difuse security practices, researchers have identiied how 
(in)security is conceptualized in terms of uncertainty. When looking at security in 
practice, one cannot conceptually constrain security to high-politics and phenomena 
such as war. New security phenomena have thus oten been described by a logic of risk. 
he emergence of uncertainty rather than the presence of a logic of deterrence is oten 
linked with the end of the Cold War. New security phenomena such as terrorism or 
environmental security have emerged, and in this context it is diicult to predict the 
next attack or hazard (Aradau, Van Munster 2007; Elbe 2008; Salter 2008). Although 
high-impact events might be rare and diicult to predict, security politics focuses on 
precautionary measures and mitigating risks (Beck 1986). his difusion of security 
practices has been described using terminology that focuses on (incalculable) risks, 
uncertainty and precaution (Kessler and Daase 2008).
In a somewhat simplistic way one could thus say that security practices follow 
either a logic of risk or a logic of high politics (cf. Balzacq 2015). his should serve 
more as a heuristic rather than a precise description, since previous research has 
shown that both logics are oten entangled. However, this idea of security politics as 
being difuse and characterized by ever-present risks serves as a foil in Section 4.1 in 
order to tease out the underlying assumption of the encryption security discourse. 
I demonstrate how themes known from previous risk-research play out when de-
scribing encryption as a security issue.
Secondly, the pervasiveness of surveillance practices and new technologies for 
warfare show how networked technology alters security practices. Research over the 
past decade has scrutinized how security technology helps not only with the difusion 
of security practices, security technology is also oten highly contested and securi-
ty debates revolve around speciic technical questions, such as the design of body 
scanners or the origin of missiles (Schouten 2014; Walters 2014). As a result CSS is 
paying increasing attention to security technology. his meant a broadening of the 
research agenda in terms of its theoretical resources by engaging with the theories of 
science and technology studies (STS), most prominently here the actor-network-the-
ory (ANT) as developed by Bruno Latour, Annemarie Mol, John Law and Michel 
Callon (Latour 1999; Callon 1984; Mol 2010). It also means expanding the object 
of research, focusing on technologies and security devices like drones or biometrics 
(Leander 2013; Jacobsen 2015).
Encryption technology has so far not been granted much attention within CSS 
(but see: Dunn Cavelty 2007). However it is a crucial technology for internet security 
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as a whole. Even more so encryption plays a crucial role in debates about surveillance 
and privacy, which are both essential topics for CSS (Amoore 2014; Bauman et al. 
2014). Researching encryption as a security technology will thus also contribute to 
how security is linked to debates on privacy via surveillance. As I demonstrate below, 
encryption is irmly embedded in the broader discourse on security, surveillance and 
privacy. Regulating security practices thus also means making decisions concerning 
the control of security technologies such as encryption. More speciic questions, like 
key-length, are open for contestation (Monsees 2017). Understanding security politics 
thus also means understanding its underlying security technology. However, when 
looking at encryption technology we can also see that values such as privacy and 
freedom are debated as well. hus we need to pay attention to both the technology 
itself and the values attached to it (cf. Barry 2012).
Understanding how certain ideas and values are negotiated requires a distinct 
approach that not only examines the material features of the technology but also the 
wider context in which the technology is embedded and the political debates that re-
volve around it. Consequently, I analyze the debates about encryption and security and 
in the next section I explicate this choice and the selection of material in more detail.
3. Methodology
his section presents the methodology and methods underlying this research. 
he aim of this article is to understand the way in which encryption is presented as 
a security issue. his requires less of an analysis of the technological features and more 
an understanding of how actors on the level of practice present encryption, and how 
it becomes a security issue. A discourse analytical perspective provides the best tools 
to achieve this aim. In line with interpretative research, I am not interested in trying 
to access the 'real intention', as the mental state of some person (Yanow, Schwartz-
Shea 2006), but rather the intersubjective meanings. Such a perspective is in line with 
discourse studies that exist in many varieties (Fairclough 2013; Wodak 1989; Foucault 
1972). he general assumption behind discourse research is that studying discourse 
reveals structures of meaning that are intersubjectively shared. Studying texts reveals 
which knowledge resources are shared and, independently of personal beliefs, I can 
reconstruct the intersubjective meaning of texts (Keller 2007).
hrough the analysis of discourse, oten with a focus on speciic linguistic features 
such as metaphors or narrative structures, it becomes possible to understand these 
structures of meaning. Again, the aim is not to ascribe speciic intentions or motives 
to an author of a text. A discourse analysis is interested in understanding the shared 
knowledge that is present in a speciic community. Analyzing this shared knowledge 
can, for example, make plausible why speciic kinds of action seemed legitimate, or 
why other actions became less likely or completely unthinkable (Hajer 1995). hrough 
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a textual analysis one can see which patterns of presenting encryption and security 
prevail. his allows me to understand which statements were possible to say and which 
not. Ultimately, I am able to reconstruct what kind of assumptions about security 
underly the discourse on encryption.
he results presented here in this article are part of a larger project which ana-
lyzed the US and German encryption discourse between 2012 and 2016 (cf. Monsees 
2017). In this paper I solely focus on Germany. Since my main interest is to show how 
encryption was presented as a security issue in popular discourse (rather than, for 
instance, among cryptologists), I focused on texts published in mass media, but also 
included statements by politicians and experts speaking in a public setting such as in 
a press release for an NGO or testifying at a public hearing. he focus on the media is 
justiied by the insight that the media discourse is of crucial importance in order to 
understand societal discourse. Although we live in a functionally diferentiated society, 
media discourse is a crucial one. It can be said that the media discourse is to mediate 
between the diferent specialized discourses (Link 2013, p. 11; 2006). Analyzing mass 
media is one of the preferred sites for discourse analysts to discover prevailing patterns 
of argumentation in a society (cf. Fairclough 1995; Meier, Wedl 2014). he main part of 
the analysis focuses on the presentation of encryption in newspaper. Newspapers are 
a prime site for the analysis, as they present arguments present not in only a special-
ized ield but make it accessible to a broader audience (Schneider 2010; Wessler et al. 
2008, p. 26–28). In the newspaper I could detect patterns of argumentation stemming 
from popular culture or expert discourse (Link 2006). While online sources become 
more important, traditional newspaper are still a dominant tool for accessing news 
(Nossek, Adoni, Nimrod 2015). Newspaper present the arguments in an accessible 
way and heir arguments circulate in the broader public. In addition, I also included 
what I call specialized magazines, written for the general public but tailored to an 
audience that is interested in information technology. hey thus present encryption 
as a security technology in accessible terms, but their coverage is oten more detailed 
than that found in newspaper (e.g. CHIP, ComputerBILD).
To be more precise: I selected articles from June 2012 to June 2016. his included 
the texts published in two major German newspapers, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, the former considered to be the more liberal and the latter 
the more conservative newspaper. he newspaper and magazine texts were selected 
with the data-bank, factiva. I did a rough irst analysis of all remaining texts and then 
selected the texts for a ine-grained analysis. Another crucial source involved state-
ments by experts at the hearing ‘Digitale Agenda’ at the German parliament, which 
took place 7 May 2014. his hearing introduced the main arguments and allowed me 
to gain access to the debate within Germany. Since the experts oten linked technical 
explanations with political recommendations, it allowed me to have a sense of how 
experts perceived technology, and how they assessed encryption as a technology. 
Since the statements were quite long (about 10 pages) it allowed me to follow more 
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complex argumentations and assessments. hese statements also formed part of the 
public discourse and, because of their length and detailed argumentation, they provid-
ed excellent sources for this project. In addition, I added texts by activists, choosing 
the main actors that are relevant to the debate. In Germany, these were: the Chaos 
Computer Club, which is not only the biggest hacker organization in Europe but also 
an important voice in the German debate, the activist group Netpilots (Netzpiloten) 
and the Crypto Group of the Society for Computer Science (Fachgruppe Krypto der 
Gesellschat für Informatik). Politicians are surprisingly silent on the issue in Ger-
many, the only longer statement that I found concerning encryption was a speech by 
then Interior Secretary homas de Maizière. he German BKA and BND (German 
Federal Police and German Secret Service) provided material on their homepage. 
In sum, I analyzed 51 texts in a ine grained way that allowed me to tease out the 
assumptions about security and technology underlying these texts. Using ancillary 
questions, I focused on the depiction of encryption, technology more general, security 
and the role of the main actors. hese questions focused my analysis and form the 
base of the results presented below.
4. Encryption and Internet Security
4.1 Encryption as a Threat and a Means for Protection
When analyzing encryption as a security theme, we can see quite quickly that 
encryption is perceived both as a threat and as a solution for internet security. En-
cryption is considered to be a means for protection against surveillance, whereas too 
powerful encryption can also be considered to be detrimental to law-enforcement. 
his shows that encryption technology only acquires its meaning as a security tech-
nology in discourse. In this section, I discuss the diferent positions that encryption 
occupies in discourse. his serves as a background to understanding the way in which 
'security' as a concept is discussed in the discourse on encryption – a topic to which 
I turn in the next section.
First, encryption is seen as a cause for higher insecurity. his way of presenting 
encryption is actually well known from the "CryptoWars" that took place in the US 
in the 1990s (Schulze 2017; Diie, Landau 1998). hese debates revolved around the 
question to what extent the state should be able to control the implementation of en-
cryption systems (i.e. its key-length or the implementation of backdoors) or whether 
this would violate privacy rights and actually decrease security by weakening available 
encryption systems. he state – here the US state, especially the NSA and the FBI – 
presented encryption in negative terms. Encryption was considered to be harmful 
since it would prevent lawful interception by law-enforcement (Denning 1996). his 
same motive can be found in the current debates revolving around encryption (some-
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times called CryptoWars 2.0, Meinrath, Vitka 2014). Schulze in his comparison of the 
two phases of the debate has shown how similar motives stemming from the 1990s 
appear again in the post-Snowden debates on encryption (Schulze 2017).
he theme of encryption as increasing insecurity emerged in the earlier days of 
the CryptoWars, but can be found today and is also present in the German debates. 
Encryption is depicted as potentially harmful by providing anonymity to criminals 
and preventing state actors gaining access to data. his theme can be illustrated by 
the statement by de Maizière at the German-French summit on cybersecurity:
 “security administration should under strict requirements – constitutional re-
quirements – be allowed and be capable of decrypting encrypted communication if 
this is necessary for their work and the protection of the population.” (de Maizère 
2015).
To be clear, de Maizière is keen on emphasizing the importance of privacy and the 
need for encrypted data for the economy. he quote above is a rare stark statement 
presenting encryption as a threat for security. For example, actors such as the BND or 
the BKA (secret service and federal police of Germany) present the increasing risks 
through networked technology and thus try to depict a threat-scenario that then 
makes stronger control of digital communication necessary. To give one example: the 
BND starts its discussion on cyber-security with reference to the increasing threat of 
espionage and the harm this does to the economy. Only in the last paragraph does 
the BND state that “[the BND] has the permission and the technical capabilities for 
the strategic capture of international data traic” (BND 2018). his means that the 
BND argues for the need to access encrypted information – but does not present 
encryption as a threat in a straightforward way. he need to have access to all kinds 
of data traic is linked with a broader concern for security in the networked world 
(Monsees 2017). hey only implicitly consider too strong encryption that cannot be 
broken by law-enforcement as a problem.
However, in the German discourse the opposing view is dominant. Encryption 
is perceived as a means for protection and state regulation of encryption is seen as 
deeply problematic (Monsees 2017). Not only is encryption considered to be a corner 
stone for the security of the economy and especially global inance, it is also seen as 
an antidote to the ever-present surveillance by the state and global ICT companies. 
Especially ater the Snowden revelations, encryption was again discussed in mass 
media as a possible solution against surveillance. Furthermore, activists supported the 
spread of encryption sotware in order to strengthen the privacy of citizens. he core 
threat is here not encryption or espionage but the increasing surveillance by secret 
services that are “out of control” (as activists present the threat in: Neumann 2014, 
Kurz/Rieger 2013). From this perspective, it is crucial that citizens use encryption in 
order to be secure from the state. his sentiment comes to the fore in the quote by the 
activist vollkorn from the Chaos Computer Club, who argues against current actions 
by the state and its secret services:
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“Rather than investing millions in the digital armament against their own pop-
ulation, the CCC demands investing this money in better technological education” 
(vollkorn 2015, my own emphasis).
Here encryption is seen as a source for protection. Interestingly, security is thus not 
a good provided by the state, but the state itself becomes the threat. Much political 
thought relies on the idea that the state provides security for its citizens, but in this 
instance we can see that the relationship is reversed and that citizens take precautions 
against harmful actions by the state.
Activists and civil-society actors highlight the huge capabilities of encryption. For 
them, the relevance of encryption lies mostly in its ability to safeguard privacy which 
is understood as a fundamental right. his link is made most explicitly in a headline 
by the group on encryption within the German Crypto Group of the Society for 
Computer Science ('Fachgruppe Krypto'):
“Cryptography protects basic rights – especially in the era of massive espionage 
of data traic on the internet“. (Fachgruppe Krypto 2014).
Encryption is considered to be a very powerful tool and a corner stone for security. 
Security from this perspective is much more encompassing, including the notion of 
privacy and security from the state. Encryption thus acquires meaning as a privacy 
protection tool. his is the more prevailing view in Germany – not only are activists 
vocal there, it is also the dominant view in mass media. he main German newspaper 
reported quite critically about the power of secret services and global companies, 
and oten present encryption as a way to prevent surveillance (cf. Steiger et al. 2017; 
Monsees 2017).
In sum, we can see that encryption acquires its meaning and status only in dis-
course. Encryption is discussed as both a source for and a threat to internet security; 
whereas internet security means security from the state or security by the state, re-
spectively. Encryption technology as such is quite ambiguous, and how it is evaluated 
is decided in discursive struggles. Even though state agents wish to have more control 
over encryption, these claims cannot be made in a straightforward way. Even state 
actors have to acknowledge that strong encryption is necessary for the economy, and 
that the possibility of surveillance needs to be balanced by claims for privacy. he 
opposing view presents encryption as a tool for higher security. Encryption is crucial 
for protection against the state, namely illegitimate surveillance and data-retention. 
his short discussion indicates the ambiguous character of technology.
4.2 Uncertainty, Risk and Encryption
he previous section summarized the main position concerning encryption as a se-
curity issue. his section now looks even more closely at what kind of understandings 
of security are present. I focus on how ‘security’ is actually conceptualized by the actors 
and show how encryption is embedded in an understanding of (cyber-)security that 
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relies on the notions of risk, uncertainty and unpredictability. I structure the discus-
sion along the three themes of uncertainty, knowledge and the role of human actors.
he irst theme here is that security is understood not as an existing state of afairs, 
but something that can actually never be achieved. Since networked technology is 
so complex and consists of so many human and non-human parts, complete secu-
rity is impossible. To illustrate this point, consider this example by one of the main 
legal experts, Nikolas Härting, on IT-security in Germany, when speaking in front 
of a parliamentary hearing: “Secure communication within the net was impossible 
at any time when considered realistically.” (Härting 2014). he idea of secure com-
munication via networked technology is already seen as an incorrect assumption. 
Härting continued to develop this issue in his statement. According to him, the 
structure of the internet itself is insecure. Complete security was never possible, 
and from that it follows that it cannot be achieved by improving just one aspect. he 
statement by internet security expert Sandro Gaycken at the same hearing follows 
the same sentiment, when he states that “systems are complex [and] IT-systems 
produce efects that [...] cannot be anticipated”. He assumes that IT systems are no 
longer controllable and their properties are no longer measurable (Gaycken 2014). 
his idea that efects and risks are incalculable speaks to the above discussed research 
on risk. While traditionally the risks of an attack were considered to be calculable, 
the dominance of uncertainty prevents this calculation (Kessler, Daase 2008). In the 
discussion on encryption and security, similar patterns and ideas can be identiied. 
Future attacks are not measurable, the impact of the next attack is not known and 
complete security is impossible.
he second theme concerns the limited knowledge about security. Knowledge 
about the ‘behavior’ of technology is limited, and the efect of technology is oten 
impossible to know because of unintended consequences (on this topic see the classic 
account by Winner 1980). Part of the problem is that an attack can happen at any time 
and target any kind of object. his idea of uncertain 'behavior' by technology becomes 
clear in the headline by Eugene Kaspersky in a German Newspaper, which states that 
cyber-attacks “can hit anyone who has access to the internet.” He then continues:
“Such cyber-attacks can sabotage pivotal infrastructure – water reservoirs, air traf-
ic control or the food chain – and have catastrophic efects. Every modern infrastruc-
ture is networked to a very high degree. […] Even the attacking country can become 
the victim to its own weapon; it is called the boomerang-efect” (Kaspersky 2012).
he insecurity of the technology lies here in its 'boomerang-efect'. Technology is 
something that cannot be easily controlled – it might fail or act in an unpredictable 
way. Later in the same text, Kaspersky talks about the 'side-efects' of technology, 
again emphasizing that technology cannot be controlled. he side-efects are rather 
a characteristic of a networked technology that is complex and multi-layered, and 
thus cannot be fully secured. Because the technology is so complex and inherently 
insecure, rendering security is diicult. What is needed is constant adaptation – hu-
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man input is crucial. his theme runs through the whole debate: since the technology 
is so complex and its afect unpredictable, human action is necessary.
But even when emphasizing the role of humans we run into a problem: the knowl-
edge of experts is limited, too. Importantly, these limits are acknowledged by the actors 
themselves. Consider this quote by an expert speaking in 2014:
“Even crypto-experts do not know how long the current algorithms will provide 
protection. […] herefore, it is necessary to inform oneself about the possibilities of 
exchange or for upgrades [lit.: upgrade-paths] before one (starts) using an encryp-
tion-solution” (Ries 2014).
Uncertainty as a prevailing theme thus also manifests in the depiction of expert 
knowledge. he value of knowledge for assessing the future is limited. Space is opened 
up for thinking about the role for human action and, with the emphasis on the limited 
knowledge of experts, where even resorting to specialists is not a straightforward op-
tion. Uncertainty thus even covers the limits of knowledge – and not only technology.
his brings us to the third theme: the role of humans. In a context that is character-
ized by uncertainty and limited knowledge, not only do we need better technological 
solutions, constant adaptation by humans is also necessary. A technological ix does 
not by default solve the complex problems. his becomes especially apparent if texts 
are analyzed that look closer at how encryption works. Since encryption relies heavily 
on mathematics, such a base is crucial for encryption to work. he following quote 
stems from an article that deals with encryption and internet security published in 
CHIP, a specialized magazine on IT-issues. Mathematics serves as an indicator for the 
potency of encryption, but at the same time the article problematizes the technology.
“According to Snowden, strong encryption ofers the best tool to protect oneself 
against global espionage, but in the way the browser and server use HTTPS-connec-
tions, the strength of the encryption does not come into play. […] Furthermore, in 
PFS the session key is not sent over the internet but computed by every party – this 
is based on pure maths. If PFS is implemented correctly, both session keys are deleted 
as soon as the communication ends” (Mandau 2014, my own emphasis).
PFS refers to perfect forward secrecy, a speciic kind of encryption that is supposed 
to ofer the best security. he emphasis on the strengths of mathematics and the 
strong capabilities of encryption contrasts its dependency on proper implementation 
by humans (users) and the technological environment, which needs to work as well. 
Although encryption (and its mathematical base) is assigned strong abilities to in-
crease security, all actors are aware that encryption always relies on implementation 
by human users. his sentiment is taken up by multiple calls to focus on the education 
of the user, who needs to become more knowledgeable. horsten Schröder a German 
IT-expert states that “customers must be […] educated” (Schröder 2014), and activists 
groups such as the Chaos Computer Club or the Electronic Frontier Foundation have 
been vocal in trying to educate users about surveillance and the role of encryption in 
providing better privacy and security. he mathematical parts of encryption are thus 
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weak if they are not accompanied by knowledgeable users. Complexity thus means 
also that mathematics, technology and a skilled end-user all have to come together 
to achieve higher security.
his section showed how security is conceptualized with references to complexity, 
risk, uncertainty and unpredictability. he analysis revealed that this is the dominant 
framework for cybersecurity in which encryption is discussed. his shit to a risk-par-
adigm in connection with highlighting the importance of not only technology but also 
human actors make certain security measures possible. Even though actors disagree 
about the assessment of encryption for security, a common reference point of com-
plexity and uncertainty make it possible to acknowledge the role of all actors (users, 
governments, companies) and technology as crucial for security. Encryption only 
works if the technical part is accompanied by skilled users and means that allow the 
governing of the complexity of networked technology. Measures such as multi-stake-
holder approaches or public-private-partnerships are thus more likely to come into 
being. Understanding that ‘security’ is not a simple task that can be provided by the 
state makes it possible to promote alternative modes of governing.
4. Conclusion: multi-stakeholderism and internet security
his article presented insights into the German public discourse on encryption. 
Based on a discourse analysis, this article focused on two main themes. I irstly showed 
the ambiguous role of encryption in the broader security discourse. Encryption is 
presented as both a threat and a solution for more security. Encryption is associated 
with two diferent, opposing meanings in terms of security. While too strong encryp-
tion is considered to be an obstacle for law-enforcement, encryption is also presented 
as the best tool to provide security from the state.
In building on this, I scrutinized what kind of understanding of security underlies 
the encryption discourse. his understanding of security in terms of uncertainty and 
incalculable risks is not unique to the cyber discourse. Indeed, scholars of interna-
tional security have long observed this shit in a variety of ields, such as health, avi-
ation and inancial security (Rasmussen 2001; Amoore 2013; Elbe 2008; Salter 2008). 
Critical analyses have shown how ideas like the precautionary principle constitute 
a distinct form of governing security (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). In the context 
of encryption, references to uncertainty make it possible to discuss the role of end 
users, infrastructure and sotware as part of a complex security landscape. Encryption 
has a crucial role in this network since it is perceived as a crucial technology.
hese insights are not only important for our understanding of encryption as 
a security issue as such, but they also have political implications. If security is dis-
cussed in terms of complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability, then this also has 
repercussions on what kind of governing practices are considered to be most efective. 
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Since cyber security involves all kind of actors, technologies that transgress traditional 
scales and cause uncertainty then the core challenge is to cope with this complexity. 
Approaches such as multi-stake holderism or public private partnerships become the 
most plausible governance mechanisms (Hofmann 2016; Carr 2016). hese methods 
of governing are perceived to be most plausible to account for the unintentional efects 
of technology, the ambiguous role of encryption and the need to educate the end-user. 
he presentation of encryption as a security issue in the way that I described above 
thus makes policy approaches such as multi-stakeholder governance more plausible. 
Although German activists are critical about the role of companies, their insistence 
on the complexity of the issue plus resentment about the power of state actors (secret 
services) allow the discursive underpinning of security measures that give power and 
responsibility to a multiplicity of actors, including companies, end-users, states and 
NGOs. In line with the discourse theoretical tenets I described above, I am not claim-
ing that the relationship between ‘logic or risk’ and ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ is 
deterministic, and I also do not clam that this is the best (or only) way to think about 
governing encryption. Answering this question would involve discussing who ‘we’ 
want to be responsible for increasing security and who will or should be empowered 
by security measures. his article is just a irst step in tackling these broader questions.
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